*NO COPY OF THIS TRANSCRIPT MAY BE MADE PRIOR TO MARCH 1, 2021

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

*

IN RE: * MDL NO. 2753

ATRIUM MEDICAL CORP. C-QUR MESH * MDL Docket No.: PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION * 16-md-02753-LM

THIS RELATES TO: * Case No.:

* 1:17-cv-742-LM

CARRIE LEE BARRON and NICHOLAS *
BARRON * November 19, 2020 * 1:02 p.m.

TRANSCRIPT OF STATUS CONFERENCE

HELD VIA VIDEOCONFERENCE

BEFORE THE HONORABLE LANDYA B. McCAFFERTY

Appearances:

For the Plaintiffs: Jonathan D. Orent, Esq.

Motley Rice LLC

Russell F. Hilliard, Esq.

Susan A. Lowry, Esq. Upton & Hatfield LLP

Anne W. Schiavone, Esq. Holman Schiavone LLC

For the Defendants: Katherine A. Armstrong, Esq.

Mark Cheffo, Esq. Paul A. LaFata, Esq.

Dechert LLP

Court Reporter:

Liza W. Dubois, RMR, CRR Official Court Reporter U.S. District Court 55 Pleasant Street Concord, New Hampshire 03301 (603) 225-1442

```
1
                      PROCEEDINGS
2
              THE CLERK: For the record, this is a status
3
    conference and motion hearing in Carrie Barron vs.
4
    Atrium, et al, 17-cv-742-LM, part of the Atrium C-Qur
5
    Mesh MDL, which is 16-md-2753-LM.
              THE COURT: Good afternoon, everyone. Good to
6
7
    see everybody.
              I think what I'll do is just quickly have
8
    everybody just introduce themselves for the record
9
    again. I obviously see you, I know who everybody is,
10
11
    but just so the record reflects who is on the screen.
12
              Let's start with --
13
              MR. HILLIARD: Russ Hilliard --
14
              THE COURT: -- Attorney Orent or, Attorney
    Hilliard, go ahead.
15
16
              MR. HILLIARD: Oh, that's all right, your
17
    Honor.
              Russ Hilliard, plaintiffs' liaison counsel.
18
19
    Thank you, your Honor.
20
              MR. ORENT: Your Honor, Jonathan Orent for the
21
    plaintiffs. Good afternoon.
22
              THE COURT: Good afternoon.
23
              MS. ARMSTRONG: Is that everyone for your
24
    side, Jon?
25
              THE COURT: I think Attorney Lowry --
```

```
1
              MR. HILLIARD: Attorney Lowry is on the line.
2
              MS. LOWRY: I was trying to unmute.
3
    apologize. Attorney Lowry for the plaintiffs. Good
4
    afternoon.
              THE COURT: Good afternoon.
5
              MS. SCHIAVONE: Your Honor, Attorney Anne
6
7
    Schiavone for the plaintiffs.
              THE COURT: Good to see you again.
8
              And I see the three defense counsel.
9
10
              MR. CHEFFO: Yes, your Honor. Good afternoon.
11
    Attorney Mark Cheffo for the defense.
12
              MS. ARMSTRONG: Good afternoon, your Honor.
13
    Katherine Armstrong for the defendants.
14
              MR. LAFATA: Good afternoon, your Honor. This
    is Paul LaFata from Dechert, also for the defendants.
15
16
              THE COURT: Okay. Excellent.
17
              All right. So let's just get started. Update
18
    me -- well, it's probably easiest for me just to see
19
    where we are.
20
              Is there any agreement on Dunn?
21
              MR. LAFATA: (Nods head.)
22
              THE COURT: There is?
23
              MR. ORENT: There is, your Honor.
24
              THE COURT: I can -- and so I don't -- is it
25
    fair to say I don't need to address Dunn at all today?
```

1 MR. ORENT: Correct, your Honor. We --2 THE COURT: Great. 3 MR. ORENT: A linguistic issue in the 4 stipulation, what we'd like to do, if it's all right 5 with the Court, is read the stipulation into the record and then provide a little bit of explanation so that the 6 7 record is clear as to where that one area where we 8 couldn't quite come up with the ideal linguistic term 9 would not be unclear by the language of the stip itself. 10 THE COURT: Excellent. Go ahead. 11 MR. ORENT: Okay. And Mr. LaFata will, I'm 12 sure, correct me if I am incorrect or using an incorrect 13 version. 14 So the language is: The parties agree and 15 stipulate that Dr. Dunn shall not testify about any 16 hazards associated with the C-Qur V-Patch device after 17 it has been implanted into the body, medical concerns 18 about implanting the device, performance of the device 19 inside the body, or that the device was defectively 20 designed. Dr. Dunn may testify about other opinions in 21 his report, including oxidation of polypropylene 22 generally or outside the body in failure mode effects 23 analysis. 24 The stipulation is not an admission of fact by 25 any party.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

That concludes the stipulation itself. However, we wanted to make clear that properly phrased questions about the scope of the testimony that Dr. Dunn is offering will not in and of themselves open the door to testimony that has been excluded by this stipulation. In other words --THE COURT: Say that again. Say that again. MR. ORENT: So properly phrased questions about the scope of Dr. Dunn's testimony under this agreement are not allowed to open the door to testimony that is excluded under the stipulation. And what we mean by that is a question like, Dr. Dunn, you're not offering a question -- testimony or an opinion about the hazards of polypropylene. That is a fair question to ask that will not open the door versus a question like, Dr. Dunn, you're not able to offer a -- testimony on that subject. And so with that attempt at clarification, I'll put it over to Mr. LaFata to make sure I've got it described correctly. MR. LAFATA: And, your Honor, Attorney Orent -- we've worked in good faith together in cobbling this out. He's right to report on it. It's noteworthy this is a stipulation about the admissibility of Dr. Dunn's opinions and I think in

```
listening to it, you can imagine it took us some time to
1
2
    get the wording right on the end of it.
3
              So we didn't want to delay reporting back to
4
    you that we have an understanding, but we're working on
5
    getting that reflected. But Attorney Orent had
    reflected that in his report to you.
6
7
              THE COURT: Okay. And that -- that makes
    sense to me. Everything that you've agreed to, it seems
8
    consistent with -- you know, with my understanding of
9
10
    his testimony, the scope of his testimony, and the
11
    arguments that were presented about it. I'm happy not
12
    to -- not to have to deal with Mr. Dunn today.
13
              So we can move then into -- Spiegelberg and
    Little, I think, are the only two that are left. Am I
14
15
    correct that there's only one -- one challenge to
16
    Spiegelberg's and Little's opinions left?
17
              MR. ORENT: That's correct with one caveat,
18
    your Honor, and that caveat is we filed a motion related
19
    to FDA evidence overall and the --
20
              THE COURT: Right.
21
              MR. ORENT: -- and the defendants have agreed
22
    that that motion encompasses the issue that we raised
23
    here and so it does not need to be dealt with
24
    separately.
```

But with that minor clarification, your Honor

25

```
1
    is absolutely correct.
2
              THE COURT: Okay. And that's true with Little
3
    and Spiegelberg?
4
              MR. ORENT: Yes, your Honor.
5
              THE COURT: Yeah. They both had opined as to
    Atrium's compliance with FDA guidance.
6
7
              Okay. And then what are you doing with
    Spiegelberg's opinion that polypropylene does not
8
    degrade and arguing it's unreliable? What are you doing
9
    with that one?
10
11
              MR. ORENT: Your Honor, we have agreed to
12
    withdraw that Daubert in recognition of your Honor's
13
    reliance on the two cases that you cited often last
14
    week.
15
              THE COURT:
                         Okay. All right. Good.
                                                     All
16
    right. I understand then the scope of this.
17
              And what I think -- I know they're similar,
18
    Spiegelberg and Little, and I'll ask counsel, would you
19
    like to argue them separately?
20
              MR. ORENT: For the plaintiffs --
21
              THE COURT: In other words, deal with
22
    Spiegelberg first and then deal with Little separately.
23
              MR. ORENT: From the plaintiffs' perspective,
24
    we can deal with these collectively. Our concern is the
25
    same issue and --
```

```
1
              THE COURT: Yeah.
2
              MR. ORENT: -- I think the Court's guidance --
3
    the Court doesn't need to issue two separate orders, in
4
    our opinion.
              THE COURT: Okay. Well, my quess is -- let's
    do Spiegelberg and then I can make a decision and I
6
7
    think it would be obvious how I would rule on Little,
    I'm quessing.
8
              So let's talk about -- let's do Spiegelberg
9
    then and we'll -- we'll start with you, Mr. Orent.
10
11
    is motion -- it's document number 88. It's your motion
12
    to exclude opinions and testimony of Stephen
13
    Spiegelberg.
14
              Originally, with regard to Spiegelberg, there
    were three arguments. One, his opinion should be
15
16
    excluded to the extent he opines as to the polypropylene
17
    manufacturer's motives for warning that its product
    should not be used in implantable medical devices. That
18
19
    argument is still live before the Court.
20
              The second argument, Spiegelberg is not
21
    qualified to opine as to Atrium's compliance with FDA
22
    guidance in developing its product, has essentially been
    withdrawn because parties agree to be bound by my ruling
23
24
    on the motion in limine that's related to that.
25
              MR. ORENT: (Nods head.)
```

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

THE COURT: And then the third argument, that his opinion that polypropylene does not degrade, you've withdrawn because you think I'm likely to rule it goes to weight, not admissibility. MR. ORENT: (Nods head.) THE COURT: So have I stated that correctly? The only argument live before me now is his opinion as to the polypropylene manufacturer's motives for the warning. MR. ORENT: That is correct, your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's go ahead and start with that. And you've got 15 -- 15 minutes. ahead. MR. ORENT: Well, your Honor, I think I'll be far briefer than that, quite frankly. This issue is a very narrow issue and what we are seeking to preclude is an opinion from this expert that the manufacturer of the polypropylene plastic used to make the base mesh in the C-Qur V-Patch that Ms. Barron was implanted with included language on their manufacturer's safety data sheet prohibiting the use of the product in medical implants, as well as a 2009 letter warning defendants not to use this polypropylene in medical devices; that that prohibition was based solely or in part on liability.

Our opinion -- or, excuse me, we move this under several different bases, but, number one, this is the classic type of intent motive testimony that your Honor heard argument about last week. I won't go through the same litany of cases, but this is squarely within the speculation as to the motives of others.

This is not an opinion -- an opinion that would be based upon any discernible methodology, subject to the *Daubert* factors of cross-examination. It would be prejudicial to take what is essentially an argument that is unsupported by fact and allow it to be bolstered by the testimony of an expert.

And then, finally, to the extent that this -even if this information were factually true, which we
believe there is no factual support for this, that it
would not be within the purview of any expert requiring
any type of explanation or opinion testimony to clarify
or to contextualize.

Now, it is important to clarify what we are not seeking to exclude just as much as what we are seeking to exclude.

We are not seeking to say that Dr. Spiegelberg cannot testify that he has not seen any evidence that the manufacturer had a scientific basis for including this language on the document. Instead, what we are

focusing in on is actually testifying that the manufacturer did, or likely did, or some gradient within that, put this warning on their product and have this policy due to liability concerns.

The factual record of this case indicates that, number one, Lyondell Basell at all material times had a policy not allowing the manufacturers to -- excuse me -- the manufacturer of medical devices to use this product for implants; that this warning was placed on their product in a variety of different ways. It was placed on manufacturer safety data sheets, technical data sheets, they had a written policy, and they would send cease-and-desist letters from time to time if they learned of noncompliance.

Throughout the factual discovery in this case, we had the opportunity to question a number of representatives and individuals within research and development at Atrium as well as in the manufacturing and other areas of Atrium and the testimony leads to the only conclusion that there was no one who, in fact, asked Lyondell Basell why this was put on there. So there is no factual information within the company's records to support that it was put on there for liability reasons only.

And, finally, no third-party discovery has

been done that indicates that there was a liability
reason.

So ordinarily I would say that this sort of testimony would also involve a 403-type analysis and would look at whether or not this is a hearsay or not hearsay purpose behind the reason we're seeking to introduce this evidence, the nonhearsay purpose being notice and knowledge to which the factual merits of the claim don't matter.

But in this particular case, because it's unfounded -- in fact, there's no bases in terms of the factual record other than the statement in the expert's deposition that in his personal experience dealing with manufacturers, they sometimes use a policy like this because of liability, there's no other basis for this statement and allowing such a statement into evidence would be prejudicial and bolstered improperly by an expert.

So for those reasons, your Honor, we believe that this is not appropriate testimony to come in certainly through an expert at this point and particularly Dr. Spiegelberg.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. And who is up for the defendants on this one?

```
1
              MR. CHEFFO: Ms. Armstrong is, your Honor,
2
    who's on mute.
3
              THE COURT:
                          All right. Excellent.
 4
              MS. ARMSTRONG:
                              Sorry. I apologize for that.
5
              Your Honor, I don't think I will need the
    entire 15 minutes either.
6
7
              The lighting is my office is not the best, so
    I apologize if I go dark periodically. I'll do my best
8
9
    to try to stay in the light.
10
              And I want to preface my argument by saying
11
    that for purposes of the argument today, we're assuming
12
    that the Court overrules any objection that we may have
13
    to the MSDS coming into evidence or being used for
14
    particular purposes at trial. Those issues aren't
15
    before the Court today, so this assumes that the factual
16
    record that Mr. Orent referred to in his argument is, in
17
    fact, allowed into evidence and the issue before the
    Court is just the question of whether or not or how our
18
19
    expert is allowed to address it.
20
              So to begin with, just to review
21
    Dr. Spiegelberg's qualifications, because they are
22
    relevant to the issue, he's a chemical engineer and a
23
    polymer expert. He's the president and cofounder of
24
    Cambridge Polymer Group, Inc., and in that capacity, he
25
    directs a team of scientists who perform contract
```

```
1
    research, analytical testing, and device development for
2
    biomedical and polymer communities. He has a PhD in
    chemical engineering from MIT, he's a postdoctoral
3
4
    fellow at Harvard, and he's published numerous articles
    in various fields.
5
              So, for context, that's his background.
 6
                                                        His
7
    qualifications aren't challenged, but I think the
8
    background is -- is relevant to the issue before the
9
    Court.
10
              Now, to look at the exact statement in his
11
    report that has triggered their motion and what they're
12
    trying -- the opinion that they're trying to exclude is
13
    this. And this is -- I'm quoting from his report:
14
              I regularly deal with raw polymer suppliers
15
    when we are developing prototype medical devices.
16
    concerns these manufacturers have about supplying
17
    polymers for medical devices result from liability
18
    concerns, rather than technical concerns.
19
              That's the statement. It's not specifically
20
    directed at Basell or Basell's state of mind -- and I'll
21
    get into that a little bit more specifically -- but
22
    that's the statement that's at issue.
23
              And that -- and, by the way, when we're
24
    talking about the statement that was made by Basell --
25
    I'm going to say Basell as opposed to Lyondell Basell
```

```
1
    because it's easier for me and as we noted last week, I
2
    sometimes have a -- have a problem with certain words,
3
    speaking out loud. But I'm going to say Basell because
4
    it's easier for me.
              When we refer to it as a warning, I'm going to
6
    call it a disclaimer. The language is what it is.
7
    we would not necessarily -- we would not agree with
    plaintiffs' characterization of it as a warning. It's a
8
9
    disclaimer. And -- but it speaks for itself.
10
              But the first reason why this does not
11
    constitute a state of mind opinion is that
12
    Dr. Spiegelberg's opinion in this case, which is not
13
    really being challenged at this point because the
14
    plaintiffs have withdrawn that part of the motion in
15
    limine, but his -- his primary opinion in this case is
16
    that the resin -- the polymer resin -- poly --
17
    polyethylene resin used by Atrium was appropriate for
18
    implantation in the body and that it was adequately
19
    tested by Atrium. That -- that opinion is his primary
20
    opinion and it's directly within his area of expertise
21
    and it's not being challenged at this point.
22
              That opinion stands in opposition to the
23
    statement made by Basell that this should not be
24
    implanted in the -- the disclaimer made by Basell that
```

this shouldn't be used in the human body or for medical

25

device implants. His opinion is that the material is, in fact, appropriate for that use.

So he's taking a direct opposition position to Basell and should be able to say that and he should be able to say, I don't think Basell's opinion is supported by the publicly available scientific evidence or by the interior -- the internal testing done by Atrium.

That falls within his -- his area of expertise and that was acknowledged by the Court in Tyree, which was upheld in mesh MDL and that's the case that the plaintiffs rely upon. That court acknowledged that his opinion that the -- what they referred to there as the medical application caution was not added for any scientific reason. That opinion offered by Dr. Spiegelberg could have been based on an analysis present throughout his report. So he -- that court acknowledged that he could rely upon other analysis -- not state of mind, but other analysis -- to support that opinion.

And just to review the other analysis that he offers for that, he cites -- he cites the long history of polypropylene being safely used as a biomaterial since the 1950s. He talks about the fact that over 150 pounds of polypropylene are used in medical devices per year. He talks about that it's been extensively used in

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

hernia repair devices. He talks about that it's extensively been studied for use in medical devices. Не describes the physical characteristics that make it suitable as a biomaterial. He describes polypropylene's performance compared to other bio -- other materials. He describes published clinical studies documenting the suitability of polypropylene for medical devices. He describes Atrium's testing -- I know I'm going too fast. He describes Atrium's testing of the material according to FDA and ISO standards. He describes and evaluates the steps taken by Atrium and/or its vendors to prepare the polypropylene for use in its mesh. he describes -- and -- and I'll stop there. That's a summary of the basis for his opinion. So that goes beyond just saying, well, we don't know whether or not Basell had that as a -- to support this disclaimer or not. He's citing based upon the publically available, what is known about this polymer, is inconsistent with public -- with Basell's disclaimer and he ought to be able to testify to that. The second thing is that he's not testifying to Basell's state of mind. What he is doing is he's describing an industry custom. He's basically saying disclaimers are routinely used within this industry by material suppliers in order to limit their liabilities.

The first thing is, number one, I don't think that's exactly going out on a limb. I think everybody in this room knows that manufacturers, not just in this sector, but in all sectors, routinely use disclaimers as a method of liability. And he's not talking about Basell's state of mind. He's talking about an industry custom. And his experience within this industry qualifies him to testify about that industry custom and it is this -- an industry custom is the type of thing that experts do testify about and he should be allowed to testify in this -- in this regard as well.

Specifically, plaintiffs are arguing -- are offering this -- these statements by Basell that at least -- on at least one ground is purported notice to Atrium, that Atrium was on notice of these statements from the manufacturer.

Now, if that's the case and if they're going to offer it for that purpose, then the industry custom is relevant to how that notice would be received. The question is not necessarily Atrium's state of mind.

It's not necessarily Basell's state of mind. It's what is customarily done in the industry and it is why would a reasonable manufacturer use this polymer notwithstanding receiving such a statement from the manufacturer. And in that regard, industry custom is

specifically relevant and Dr. Spiegelberg is qualified to testify about industry custom.

And I would make another note. You know,

Mr. Orent noted that they're going to -- part of the

evidence that they're going to offer is that Atrium

didn't contact Basell to see if they had any data. I

think that that's a question for cross-examination, not

a question for exclusion. It was a -- as your Honor

noted last week when we were discussing the Daubert

hearings made by my defendants, but I would also offer a

couple of other observations.

On its face, the disclaimer makes no mention of data supporting the statement and Basell's not an unsophisticated participant in this sector. If they had data, they know how to publish it. If they have data, they know how to make their customers aware of it.

And the other thing is if you actually look at the statement -- and at this point I'm going to read from the letter. This was attached as Exhibit D to the -- to the plaintiffs' motion.

It says: Basell's very clear policy as expressed in our product data sheets is that our materials, not -- including, but not limited to Pro-fax 6523 are never to be used in -- I'm not going to read the entire statement, but they talk about the policy is

that they're not to be used as medical device -- medical
implants and their policy applies to all of their
materials, not just Pro-fax.

and, again, that language speaks for itself and the jury can draw its inferences from it, but it's not suggestive that this is an issue that is unique to this specific material or that it is somehow data-driven. So in that regard, again, I don't think that Dr. Spiegelberg is going out on any kind of limb when he describes industry custom about disclaiming things for purposes of limiting liability.

And if plaintiffs want to use this evidence to suggest that there is or their experts want to use this evidence to suggest that there is some kind of data underlying these statements, that's equally speculative, that's equally state of mind, and Dr. Spiegelberg should be allowed to describe industry custom in order to refute that kind of inference that might otherwise be drawn from it.

So I'll conclude there unless your Honor has any questions.

THE COURT: So let me just ask. I'm wondering how this opinion on liability concerns -- liability suggests -- or concern about liability suggests there

1 may be a risk of harm for which liability may attach. 2 MS. ARMSTRONG: I don't think that --THE COURT: So brushing off the concerns as 3 4 liability-related does not suggest that there are no 5 scientific concerns about the risk of harm. To that 6 extent, the opinion seems unhelpful to the jury, just on 7 a basic level. MS. ARMSTRONG: Well, I think, your Honor -- I 8 think that when he refers to liability, he's referring 9 to the risk of being sued. And all --10 11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MS. ARMSTRONG: -- companies -- who likes to 13 be sued. They don't like to be sued either. We think 14 that Atrium's product is perfectly good and we don't 15 believe there are good grounds for this lawsuit and that 16 we're ultimately going to recover at trial. 17 That didn't stop Atrium from getting sued. 18 That doesn't stop Atrium from spending a lot of money 19 defending this lawsuit. Companies don't like to get 20 sued and they may disclaim liability or disclaim -- or 21 include disclaimers such as Lyondell did for purposes 22 of -- as a defense to a lawsuit, to hopefully get out of 23 a lawsuit on a motion to dismiss or not be sued at all 24 and not incur litigation expenses rather than they're 25 just concerned about exposure to liability.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So the fact that it is -- that it could be and it's consistent with industry custom that the statement in the -- in the MSDS or in the letter from Basell could be driven by a desire to avoid litigation as opposed to any unique knowledge or data that Basell might have had regarding its product, which the -- the statements don't reflect and are inconsistent with publicly available data, that would be helpful to the jury, I think. Because, otherwise, the inference that the plaintiffs would have the jurors draw is that Basell knows something, that Basell has some data that isn't disclosed, and -- or that Basell -- Basell knows something about its product that's not otherwise known to Atrium or the rest of the industry. And there's no basis for that. There's a lot -- there's -- this -poly --THE COURT: How can you say there's no basis for it, though, when the plaintiffs have experts and papers that talk about the polypropylene degrading in vivo or the likelihood that it would degrade in vivo? MS. ARMSTRONG: Well, again, that's -- that's

MS. ARMSTRONG: Well, again, that's -- that's not -- that's -- I don't have a problem with either expert's -- either side's experts talking about the publicly available information about polypropylene.

What I'm saying is that they're -- the suggestion that

```
Lyon -- that Basell had some specific information or
1
2
    some interpretation of their -- of the publicly
    available information that is relevant, there's no basis
3
4
    for that. That's equally speculative. That's equally
    state of mind.
5
              And if you do not allow the expert to talk
 6
7
    about, well, here's all -- here's the reason why that
    statement is inconsistent with what is known
8
    scientifically about the product and here's why -- and
9
10
    here's another explanation for why that statement might
11
    be made based upon industry custom, if you don't allow
12
    that in, then you're inviting the jury to speculate the
13
    way the plaintiffs would suggest that they speculate
14
    without the defendants being able to adequately counter
15
    it.
16
              THE COURT: Okay. I'm just going to be
17
    straight with you here. I've read everything before
18
    this. I've thought about this argument.
19
              This is so different than the argument that
20
    you made at the last hearing: Atrium did a study on X,
21
    that study reached a conclusion on X and their expert
22
    was simply going to say one plus one equals two. The
23
    expert was going to say Atrium knew of the conclusion of
24
    Χ.
```

And you said, Judge, keep that out; that

25

expert is opining on Atrium's motives. That's what you argued. And I thought -- and, as you know, I said, I need to hear that in context. But my first instinct was that's one plus one equals two.

This is very different from that. This is a warning placed on a product by company Y and the warning states what it states. And you're asking me to allow an expert to opine on the reasons why they put that statement there? That's classic motive and intent.

And so, for me, this is a bold argument that you're making in light of what you argued with respect to Langstein and Klinge, I believe were the two witnesses who made that one plus one equals two. But I was willing to -- to say, yeah, there is some way in which they are opining as to what Atrium knew, but ultimately it's such -- it's not a factual leap.

This borders on -- and this is not coming in under any circumstances. I can tell you that. And I -- I look at Tyree and it looks like Spiegelberg's opinion was excluded for the same reason. The Court said that it wasn't grounded on scientific analysis, but rather on his personal belief and experience and because testimony as to the knowledge, motivations, intents, state of mind or purposes of a company and its employees is not a proper subject for expert or even lay testimony.

I see him completely as an expert on polymer chemistry. No question he can say that this product is not going to degrade in vivo if he has the ability and the expertise and the data to say that. That's not a stretch.

about -- about the motives of the company that put the very statement on the product. That is not happening in this case. In this -- in this trial, that is not happening. That would be error of -- of huge dimension.

I -- I am not going to have a jury sit there and listen to an expert on chemical polymers talk about the motives of a company who puts a warning on its product, a warning that apparently there is expert data and there's science that supports the warning. But you're going to have an expert tell the jury, well, you know, they were motivated to protect themselves from lawsuits like this one. It is not happening in my courtroom. That argument is not occurring.

And it is -- to the extent that you wanted to have these two experts, Little and Spiegelberg, testify as to Basell's or industry standards about the motives with respect to liability and preventing lawsuits, that is granted. 100 percent granted. There is no room -- no room for argument.

1 I think there's a teeny, teeny bit of wiggle 2 room with respect to Langstein and Klinge, but, honestly, those -- that's night and day in terms of the 3 4 differences here in terms of motive and intent. And the 5 improper commenting on that here is just -- this is a bold argument, especially in light of the fact that you 6 7 were challenging the ability of Langstein and Klinge to opine on something that was just, frankly, common sense 8 and obvious, that Atrium would know about its own 9 studies. 10 11 So that I'm going to give short shrift, 12 because that's what it deserves, that argument, in both 13 Little and Spiegelberg. 14 So with respect to document number 88, that is 15 granted. 16 Plaintiffs have withdrawn the motion to the 17 extent it argues that Spiegelberg's opinion that 18 polypropylene does not degrade as unreliable and 19 speculative. 20 Plaintiffs have additionally withdrawn the 21 motion to the extent it argues that Spiegelberg lacks 22 qualifications to opine as to Atrium's compliance with 23 FDA guidance for development of medical devices. 24 But with respect to his offering the opinion 25 that the manufacturer of the polypropylene Atrium uses

1 to make its surgical mesh product lacked any scientific 2 reason for warning that its product should not be used in implantable medical devices and that the manufacturer 3 4 included that warning in its material safety data sheets 5 solely due to unspecified liability concerns, to the extent plaintiff seeks to prevent Spiegelberg from 6 7 providing that opinion testimony, the motion is granted for the following reasons, some of which I've already 8 stated. 9 10 Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, a 11 qualified expert may testify in the form of an opinion 12 if the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data. 13 Spiegelberg's opinion that the manufacturer 14 lacked a valid scientific reason for providing its 15 warning is not based in his own scientific analysis or 16 expertise, but rather on his acquaintance with 17 representatives of unspecified polymer suppliers. This 18 is an inadequate factual basis for the proffered 19 opinion. 20 To the limited extent Spiegelberg may intend 21 to base his opinion on his assertion -- and you didn't 22 talk about this specifically in the argument, but it's 23 in your briefing -- that polypropylene has the same NFPA

hazard rating as ultra high molecular weight

polyethylene, which is used for hip and knee permanent

24

25

implants, the Court finds his opinion inadmissible as
well.

Nothing in the Court's record suggest that the National Fire Protection Association hazard rating system is intended to provide information relevant to implantation of medical devices.

Courts to have considered the question generally found that opinion as to the intentions or motivations of corporations is outside the proper scope of expert opinion, particularly where such opinion lacks an adequate basis in fact.

And I would cite to Doe vs. Pike and In Re:

Rezulin Products Liability Litigation. Doe vs. Pike, a

Massachusetts, District of Mass. 2019; In Re: Rezulin is
a Southern District of New York 2004.

The motion is, therefore, granted as to Spiegelberg's proffered opinion regarding the polypropylene manufacturer's purported motives for warning against the use of its product in medical devices. All such opinion testimony will be excluded.

And what I'd like to do is just simply say the same ruling applies to Little, but to the extent there are differences or there's something I need to clarify with the record, let me know. But I would grant the motion with respect to Mr. -- Dr. Little opining in the

```
1
    same way. I would grant that in full.
2
              Anything else to say with regard to the
    pending motions? Because I know we want to talk about
3
4
    the -- talk about online questionnaire and voir dire.
5
              MR. ORENT: Nothing from the plaintiffs, your
6
    Honor.
7
              MS. ARMSTRONG: Nothing from the defendants,
    your Honor.
8
9
              THE COURT: Okay. All right.
              I have invited our court's -- the chief deputy
10
11
    clerk of our court who, frankly, knows all things --
12
    COVID protocols and knows all things jury-related and
13
    has helped me with -- in every case with online
14
    questionnaires and the process. It would be different
15
    if we do an in-person or a hybrid in-person trial versus
16
    if we do a video entirely trial.
17
              So, Tracy -- I'm going to have Tracy here to
18
    take your questions. Her last name is Uhrin. And she
19
    would be helping us during a video trial or training the
20
    people who would be helping us during a video trial.
21
              And so let's -- let's -- let's talk about the
22
    online questionnaire process and the questions you may
23
    have.
24
              I'll let Tracy just summarize for you how we
25
    do it generally and then we'll -- we'll follow up with
```

some questions and we'll develop maybe a timetable.

DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: So -- so in the past, in trials we've had so far, we issue a questionnaire to the jurors that are -- like a subset of jurors that are kind of designated for your case and we ask kind of general voir dire questions. Now, in a civil case, it's a little bit tricky because most of the general voir dire questions kind of relate back to the topics that are involved in the case.

So -- but in the -- for prior trials we have not identified the case that the jurors are being -- or asking -- being asked questions about. So we kind of keep that a mystery, but we ask general voir dire questions.

I think the trade-offs are -- for you to consider is if you disclose the name of the case, obviously that can give jurors an opportunity to research the case in advance. But, again, with the standard civil voir dire, it can be tricky to ask questions to get at juror bias without disclosing something about the case. So -- but we can ask whatever questions you'd like.

I think we also always ask the question about the schedule so that we can make sure that jurors who won't be available for the trial can be vetted in

advance.

And we also ask some questions about COVID, which, again, those questions may or may not apply, depending on the structure of your trial and your jury selection.

Generally the schedule is -- Judge, is this scheduled for jury selection the 20th?

THE COURT: Yes.

DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: Okay. So I was looking at a calendar earlier and generally we would issue maybe those questions to the jurors, say, you know, give or take January 4th, give the jurors about four days to respond, provide the first set of responses of people who do it by the deadline to counsel the next day and then we'll send you a couple updates with stragglers.

And then we usually set a deadline maybe the following week, on the -- let's see, like the following Wednesday or so for counsel to meet and confer and notify the Court of which jurors they agree to strike for cause. And so we might start with, say -- I mean, we might start with 150 jurors who get this questionnaire and then we just kind of whittle it down.

So there might be jurors that you agree to strike for cause. We get down to a smaller subset that then participate in the additional steps of jury

1 selection. And, again, depending on the structure of 2 your jury selection will kind of depend on how that 3 goes. 4 So --THE COURT: We would come together -- we would 5 6 come together, we would agree on the online 7 questionnaire. 8 DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: Right. THE COURT: It's going to be my standard civil 9 voir dire questions, which you've heard in every civil 10 11 case you've ever done. Then I will have gone through 12 your proposed voir dire and I will have looked at that 13 for standard-type questions that I completely think are 14 fine. 15 I usually allow questions. Generally I 16 rewrite them typically because they're usually too wordy 17 and they're just a little hard to understand. I will 18 simplify them, but I generally give lawyers the 19 questions they're asking for unless they're like unreasonable, which is rare. 20 21 And so we would agree on an online 22 questionnaire. We have to strategize depending upon, 23 you know -- I guess we could tell them -- they'd have to 24 know the name of the parties because they'd have to know

that for any sort of conflicts. And then we would ask

25

them, you know, questions specific to the case and we would just have to decide do we want to do that as part of the online process and the culling process before we do the either in-person voir dire or the equivalent via video.

Is that right, Tracy?

DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: Right. And what I would add is what -- what we'd include in the online questionnaire may be somewhat determined by what type of jury selection we do.

So if there is still going to be an in-person jury selection at the courthouse, then we would have a little more flexibility on which questions actually get into the online questionnaire and we can be selective about what information we provide to the jurors in advance for the purposes of culling them and which questions just only get asked at the courthouse.

If we're doing an on -- if there's an online selection where the jurors are being examined by Zoom, say, then it's more important that they get the complete set of voir dire questions in advance, including the case information, attorney information, all the issues in the case, so the complete set of voir dire that would have been asked at the courthouse.

THE COURT: If it's in person, what we do is

we bring in whatever number -- let's say there's 70 after you have gone through and agreed on for-cause strikes and we've whittled it down. There may be 70 left, probably less in a civil case, although this one is an unusual civil case because it's going to require a month of their time. So maybe we would want to have a bigger group.

So we would bring approximately 70 to the courthouse, we put them ten in separate courtrooms or thereabouts -- 10 to 12, Tracy? -- in separate courtrooms.

And we have multiple courtrooms and we have a ceremonial courtroom which is very large and the air flow is good and there's a way to space everybody and still maintain, you know, a six- to ten-foot distance between jurors. And that's the room where you exercise your peremptories and you actually fill the jury box.

But they are coming in for their individual voir dire in groups of -- well, they come in one by one, but they come in in groups of ten and Tracy and her crew are staging it so that they're keeping their distance and they're walking in one at a time.

We have headphone systems that are very, very good, very sensitive, so that you lawyers have them on, the judge has them on, the prospective juror is wearing

them, and you're whispering and you can hear them. You can hear them perfectly. In fact, if they talk with the voice level I'm speaking at, it will blow people's ears because it's so sensitive.

And so you engage with the juror with the individual voir dire as you would at sidebar, but you engage with them with their headphones on, the judge is listening, the lawyers are listening, and the juror is answering questions.

Then we move the juror away, we discuss -- we discuss what -- what we're going to do with the juror, and then I make a ruling on whether they're excused or qualified.

And then, Tracy, if they're excused, they're out of the building, they're gone for the day?

DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: (Nods head.)

THE COURT: And if they're qualified, they go into a separate courtroom and they wait and we limit the numbers in that courtroom and keep them socially distanced and we're monitoring this the whole time until we get down to that number that we need for you to exercise your peremptories, and that happens in the ceremonial courtroom, and then we have a jury.

And it's been successful each time that we've done it. It was masterminded by the person on the

screen here, Tracy Uhrin. And so I'm very confident in that procedure.

If our numbers do start to head down again, which I'm really hoping for -- in New Hampshire right now they're headed straight up. But if they can go back down, if they can dip back down, I know that I'm very confident in our -- in our jury trial COVID procedures and I'm confident in our courthouse. It's just that there are a lot of moving parts with this particular trial because there's so many out-of-state people, so many out-of-state witnesses, that if we're doing it in person during COVID, it -- it could be very challenging, just because you're coming into New Hampshire and New Hampshire has the required 14-day quarantine.

Now, you can do that, you can quarantine in your home state, but you've got to drive into

New Hampshire. You can't be flying or taking public transportation into New Hampshire. If you do that, you've got a 14-day quarantine when you get to

New Hampshire.

So it's very complicated because of the number of people involved that are out of state for an in-person jury trial. However, as you know, I've thought about a hybrid possibility and, you know, obviously we can talk about that as well.

But that's how the jury selection process goes for an in-person jury and then obviously we would adjust it for a video selection.

For people who don't have Internet, we will offer a laptop in a courtroom in our courthouse and they will be able to have Internet. We will have tech -- tech service available for them and they'll be able to participate using a laptop in our courthouse. And we would set that up -- we have multiple courtrooms, we have a jury assembly room, we would have places to put people who would need the Internet and need a computer in order to do this via video.

So that's -- so that's an issue that we've thought about and we're prepared to -- to deal with.

With respect to a trial, once we get our trial and we get our jury, we can think about how we take care of people who don't have -- who don't have a laptop.

Maybe they have Internet access, but they wouldn't have the ability to have a laptop. Maybe the court could supply an iPad. We'll cross that bridge when we get there, but these are things that the court is thinking about.

What questions did you all have? I'm glad you're thinking about this ahead of trial. The sooner we can make these decisions and we can get our ducks in

a row in terms of voir dire and in terms of the process, 1 2 the better off we are. 3 MR. ORENT: Judge, this is --4 MR. LAFATA: Go ahead. 5 THE COURT: No, no, you go ahead. Oh, it was 6 Attorney Orent. I'm sorry. 7 MR. LAFATA: Yes. MR. ORENT: Your Honor, from the plaintiffs' 8 perspective, we had a number of questions about the 9 process, but one of the big questions is hardship. 10 11 As we are looking at, you know, COVID, I know 12 that the court has some standard conditions on hardship, 13 but one of the issues that's -- that's occurred to me is 14 that there may be folks who -- if we go to a situation where the New Hampshire school system shuts down and we 15 16 don't want a certain population of people, that is, 17 parents, to not be able to participate because of that. 18 And so I guess what I'm asking is if we get into a situation like that and we're doing a remote 19 20 trial -- sort of two parts: Number one, would they have 21 the ability to come into the courthouse to watch the 22 trial in a -- in a secured area if we're doing a full 23 remote trial such that there wouldn't be the 24 distractions of home or whatnot if that's an issue; and 25 then the second part of that is would we consider

adjusting the length of our day so if parents need to do some assistance with school, they can still be on a jury, if need be.

And I'm not necessarily suggesting that that is something we need to do, but, really, just throwing that out there for thought and discussion. Those are the primary two questions that I had, your Honor.

THE COURT: I think those are questions that we can cross the bridge when we get there. I think the hardship issue probably will come up. It's probably good to discuss it and come up with options to offer individuals and maybe come up with an agreed procedure that we'll use.

And with regard to a fully remote situation, I think we would have the capability to offer a room for a juror who needs that at any point during the trial.

And what we're doing is we are having some in-court hearings and we are having jury trials. This trial -- if this was fully remote, my -- I wouldn't want to be getting in the way of judges having jury trials, in-person criminal jury trials. So we would probably still have those, but we could safely use one or two and we could find other rooms, too, where I think there's good air filtration, ventilation, that are safe. So I think we could cross the hardship bridge and come up

with solutions to that.

With regard to the shorter day, I think, again, we've had three criminal jury trials. They've been a week -- they've been a week in length, each one of them, and some of them longer. And the judges have gone generally from 9:00 to 5:00, 9:30 to 5:00, 9:00 to 4:00.

In Massachusetts, I know that Judge Saris just did a jury trial, criminal trial, and I think she -- she was thinking about a shorter day. And I know in Massachusetts they generally use a shorter, more truncated jury trial day. But it's going to depend on how things are going. I think you're talking about being on video for -- for eight hours is just going to be too much for people.

MR. ORENT: I think a combination of that, but also my concern, quite frankly, is, you know, having lived through the fall with two kids of school age, I know that even though online learning is supposed to be an individualized effort, very often the parents are involved in doing a lot for their kids. And so, you know, we wouldn't want to prohibit any of those folks from, you know, participating in the jury.

And so if it needs be, and I'm not saying that this is something that we're pushing for, but, in fact,

```
I'm hoping that we can avoid any hardship, but I would
1
2
    just hate to lose any large fraction of the jury due to
    that. And so I'm sort of throwing it out as an issue
3
4
    that we should think about and if it becomes a problem,
5
    address it, but, yeah, that was one of the things that
6
    came to my mind.
7
              THE COURT: Okay. Tracy, do you have any
    ideas with respect to that?
8
              DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: So -- and this is -- in
9
    the situation where we have -- where the jury -- it's
10
11
    not the hybrid model, where the jurors are in the
12
    building, but the -- a situation where the majority of
13
    the jurors or the -- or the presumption is that the
14
    jurors are at home and participating by Zoom? Is that
15
    correct?
16
              MR. ORENT:
                         Yes.
17
              DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: Then, I mean, I think we
18
    do have some places in the courthouse. We certainly
19
    have laptops that the jurors could use in our building.
20
    It would just be an issue of, you know, how many that
21
    winds up being.
22
              And, also, some respects whether the jurors
23
    also need to individually be separated. So I can see a
24
    question about whether, you know, if there's four jurors
25
    who are at the courthouse together and then the rest of
```

the jurors are at home separately, I don't know whether that's an issue for anyone, but we need to keep those jurors separate, the ones that are at the courthouse, and that would just be another logistical question.

But I don't have any concerns about our ability to do that. It would just be questions like that, like what is the expectation of counsel and the judge when the jurors are at the courthouse.

MR. CHEFFO: Your Honor, I mean, I -- to take the point, I think we all would like to make this as accommodating for anyone, so that's, you know, not an issue. I think it's -- you're kind of suggesting that we probably need to think about this and have protocol and things that we could, frankly, just -- just, practically, if somebody has a small child, even if we were to do it four or five hours a day, they still have to drive to the courthouse.

And, I mean, so some of these things may not really make that much of a difference, or they may, but I think it's probably something we need to kind of think about and then probably, you know, get the Court's guidance about what it's going to look like in terms of, you know, the -- the kind of venire.

MR. ORENT: Your Honor, one other question that we had was -- and Mr. LaFata and I have been

working on a supplemental juror questionnaire, you know, the sort of questions that could be published online, and we have exchanged drafts. I don't think we're too far apart at this point.

But I guess the most pressing question is when would the Court like that by to start looking through and deciding, you know, whether or not our questions are acceptable and what's that lead time that you need so that everything from a technological standpoint can go smoothly?

THE COURT: I think that you get that to me sooner rather than later and I'll try to get it ruled on and we can have another -- to the extent we need to hammer anything out, we can have another quick meeting via Zoom and finalize that online questionnaire.

And then Tracy would just need it a certain number of days before technically our jury selection, right? When would you send that out to the venire?

DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: So, you know, the latest I'd want to send it out is January 4th. I maybe would want to send it out sooner except then we're getting into the holidays and I'm worried that people might miss -- people -- we might have fewer people who miss it, but -- who don't get it. But maybe we could send it out the week before and then send a reminder on the 4th.

Because of the length of this trial, it's not so much that I think we need time to process it or the jurors need time to answer the questions, but we -- if the -- probably the more advanced notice we give a jury panel that they may be -- that they've been kind of selected for a trial that could last three to four weeks, maybe the longer -- maybe the more likely it is that the jurors can kind of rearrange -- make arrangements to be available. If we tell them that for the first time on January 4th, even that might not be a lot of notice.

So I've kind of been thinking as -- about this as you've been talking and I originally had thought we would publish it on January 4th, that would be our normal schedule, but I wonder if it makes sense to actually publish it sooner so that jurors can start thinking about making arrangements.

I'm also vastly increasing the numbers of jurors we should send this to in my head because I do think we're going to get -- I think you're going to get a -- I think the bulk of the discussion that you have in advance of selection about people who should be struck for cause are going to be those people who say there's no way I can do three to four weeks.

MR. ORENT: Okay.

THE COURT: I will let you know, and Tracy can give you the anecdotal evidence, but our jurors have been, thus far, very eager to serve. We've been somewhat surprised but in awe of these New Hampshire prospective jurors. And once they're done serving, they've been very grateful that they had the opportunity and they felt very safe. That's the feedback we've been getting after our -- our COVID jury trials.

We have paused jury trials for the month of December. Our court decides this on a month-to-month basis with respect to jury trials and we have done a very -- I'm very proud of our court in terms of how we've handled COVID.

We did jury trials -- we were one of the first courts to really start doing jury trials and we have a process with respect to picking those -- prioritizing our criminal cases and then allowing more recently some civil cases to have a sort of rolling priority.

But we -- we decided to pause jury trials for the month of December just the other day, I mean very recently, which I think is also a smart decision. We're not pausing anything else; we're still doing our in-court hearings, grand jury is still happening, we're doing sentencing hearings, change of plea, because they involve smaller numbers coming to the courthouse, but

the numbers in New Hampshire are exponentially increasing, as they are everywhere, but here they really are going up very, very quickly. And the governor anticipates 500 to a thousand people, new positives, every day by the end of November. So we -- we are pausing jury trials in December and we will make a decision on January jury in-person trials in -- probably end of December.

I'm not hopeful about -- I'm not hopeful about the numbers in January, but that's just me telling you and being transparent because I've been watching this so carefully since mid-March. I'm not that hopeful about January, but I am hopeful and I'm confident that if we do a video trial in this case that it will be done well and that we'll have good protocols.

And my -- my experience -- and I know I'm a broken record, you've heard me try to sell you on video trials already -- but our experience with them so far in terms of evidentiary hearings -- we have not had a trial yet, but evidentiary hearings that have lasted multiple days -- it has been a successful experience from everybody's standpoint and viewpoint. So I'm confident that -- that we have the technology and we have the ability to pull it off if it ends up that we can't do an in-person jury trial.

I also really like the idea that I came up with at one of our conferences of doing a hybrid, where I would oversee a jury and then we could deal with some of those more difficult issues because I would be with the jury and we could spread out in a courtroom and be safe even -- even if the numbers get -- get very bad. I think we could still do that fairly safely.

The problem is that I would be -- I would be monopolizing a courtroom for a month and with a -- a jury and so we'd have to figure out exactly how we handle that. Tracy would figure it out, I have no doubt, but we'd have to --

DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: I'm sure we could -
THE COURT: -- figure out how we would -- but

I'm confident in our protocols. Our infectious disease

expert really loves our protocols. He thinks they are

outstanding. And so it may be that we could pull off

some sort of hybrid jury trial, even if it's -- even if

it remains rather dark and bleak.

So --

MR. ORENT: Your Honor, could we start raising with the Court in terms of getting our technology set?

I know that we at least behind the scenes on the plaintiffs' side and I presume Mr. LaFata and Mr. Cheffo and their team, Ms. Armstrong, are doing the same, but

```
1
    in terms of -- there's a certain element of this trial
2
    that's definitely going to be a video trial and so I'm
3
    wondering if -- just to make sure that we're ready to go
4
    from a mechanics standpoint, the -- you know,
5
    understanding all the technological details that need to
6
    be done, I think from -- at least from our perspective,
7
    the sooner that we can start working and collaborating
    to find the solutions and protocols, the easier it'll be
8
9
    for everyone in the long run. So we're open to that, I
    guess is what I'm saying.
10
11
                         Okay. Excellent. I -- I'm happy,
              THE COURT:
12
    too, to come up with maybe a procedural order that sets
13
    out a timeline by which we should have certain things
14
    lined up, like the voir dire and the online
15
    questionnaire.
16
              Perhaps -- perhaps we make that the next thing
17
    that we do together and you just let me know -- would
18
    ten days be enough for you to finalize your voir dire,
19
    your online questionnaire?
              MR. LAFATA: Your Honor, I think so.
20
21
    Attorney Orent had mentioned, we have been working very
22
    closely on a number of exchanges, exhibit lists,
23
    deposition designation, witness lists. We've actually
24
    gone down those roads together.
25
              We've also been working together on an online
```

questionnaire. I think a ten-day -- from my perspective, a ten-day proposal sounds reasonable.

And the parties have made some very good progress on taking care of as much as we can in advance. So bringing Ms. Uhrin together with -- in this discussion is very helpful for us because Attorney Orent and I can talk a lot, but we can only go so far until we find out what the Court's preferences are and the online questionnaire and that sort of thing.

So I think that's a reasonable proposal. Many of the other things the Court may have had in mind could be complete already. I know the parties have been exchanging a lot of pretrial information so far.

THE COURT: Well, I'm trying to get you rulings on things swiftly so that that will also help you figure out your exhibits, help you figure out how the trial will go, and I'm going to continue. There are still pending motions obviously that I'm going to rule on for you. So I'm working on those.

And what we could do is let's schedule our next hearing ten days out and I'll have Donna communicate with counsel to pick a time and a date that works and we will finalize that online questionnaire, which will make Tracy very happy and then she can decide when to distribute that. She'll distribute it and then

we'll get the jurors' answers and then you'll have 1 2 copies of those. And, frankly, you will be working on it 3 4 without my knowledge or awareness. You'll just be 5 working on it and deciding which jurors you're striking for cause by agreement and culling the jury pool. And 6 7 then at that point we'll have our prospective juror venire and we'll figure out how we go from there. 8 It does make a difference if they're in person 9 versus video, so that's one decision we're going to have 10 11 to -- have to figure out. 12 MR. ORENT: Right. 13 MR. CHEFFO: And, your Honor, you may have 14 said it. That was going to be my final question, is --15 is, you know, I mean, not arguing the merits, but I 16 think, you know, at least one of the issues, the main 17 concerns we've always had, right, is having just 18 folks -- whether it's six hours, eight hours, ourselves, 19 you know, in our house somewhere watching a screen. So 20 you know our view has been if -- you know, live or at 21 least some type of hybrid. 22

But to the more process issue, do you have a sense -- is that something you think you will need to kind of wait until the end of December or is that something that you can -- you can tell us it will either

23

24

25

be full-on live or it will be a hybrid live with maybe 1 the one attorney, you said, or have the jury in the 2 3 courtroom; is that -- not to press you, your Honor, but 4 that will help us --THE COURT: No, no, no. I'm -- I think you 5 know that I'm transparent. I'm going to tell you what I 6 7 think. And as I sit here right now, I think the most 8 likely thing would be a hybrid of some sort. That's 9 because I don't -- I don't see the numbers taking a big 10 11 downturn in January. I hope they do. I don't see that 12 happening. I see post-Christmas -- I see them going up. 13 However, I really am comfortable with the idea of having myself and a small number of jurors. That's 14 a -- that's a catch, too, because this is a month-long 15 16 trial. The thought of having a small number of jurors 17 is a bit risky because we're going to have people who 18 get exposed to COVID or family members get exposed and they're thereby quarantined and, therefore, off the 19 20 jury. So we're going to have to account for that in the 21 number of our jurors, which then limits me in terms of 22 my comfort level for being in the courtroom with that number of jurors. 23 24 What do you think would be a fair number of 25 jurors? A jury of eight and then how many alternates?

My civil juries are juries of eight generally. And in -- according to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, alternates deliberate. They stay and deliberate with the jury.

So we would be picking alternates with it in mind that some people are going to be exposed in some way to COVID and have to quarantine.

MR. LAFATA: We've been contemplating the need, your Honor, to have additional jurors in a number of these phases, not only in the original pool that you'd narrow down because of an increased likelihood of COVID-related hardships or other hardships, but also because of the duration of the trial.

We've also been contemplating the likelihood of the need of a few more alternates than may be typical. I think that we have proposed in the neighborhood of four alternates as opposed to -- which is, you know, more than I think would be typical, but we're just trying to think of many of the things the Court has said, what will happen if jurors have issues come up that we can't foresee and we don't want to have something unavoidable happen in the middle of trial.

MR. ORENT: Your Honor, from the plaintiffs' perspective, we, of course, recognize that the Court's preference is eight jurors and that there is no

1 distinction between alternates and jurors under the 2 federal process. We also have the burden of proof. 3 And, you know, quite frankly, the more jurors we add, 4 that does impact our case potentially. 5 And so we -- I think our preference would be 6 to stick with eight and if that required us to move to a 7 more remote situation to account for that, that people will need to quarantine and this way they can quarantine 8 and watch the trial, that would be our preference, quite 9 frankly, your Honor. 10 11 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think I would be 12 inclined to have at least four alternates, so I think 13 I'd be inclined to have 12 sitting there in the jury 14 box. And I think that is probably the lowest I would go 15 because I can just foresee four of them are going to be 16 gone. Let's just say it. Four people are going to be 17 exposed to COVID somehow, some way, or some family 18 member is going to be exposed, unless the numbers go 19 way, way, way down. 20 So I think you'd end up with a jury of eight 21 or six, if we're lucky. And if it goes below six --22 MR. ORENT: Right. 23 THE COURT: So ultimately I think you do want to have a verdict in the trial and so I think we've got 24 25 to have a jury of at least 12.

1 What do you think, Tracy --DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: Yeah. 2 THE COURT: -- for a jury of a month long? 3 4 DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: Yeah. I mean, in our 5 criminal trials, we selected four alternates for all of our -- all three of our jury -- criminal jury trials 6 7 we've had so far. The longest was about a week. And we used alternates in every case, some of them even before 8 the trial started, between selection and -- and so --9 10 and that was when the numbers in New Hampshire, the 11 COVID numbers, were much, much lower. 12 And so I think what we're seeing now in 13 New Hampshire is that it's very, very common for people 14 to have to quarantine because of exposure to a positive 15 case. And so that can keep me up at night, having 16 fewer. 17 MR. ORENT: Well, your Honor, as I indicated I 18 think previously, our preference is to move this trial 19 along as quickly as we can and I am very understanding 20 as to what the Court is saying and what the Court's 21 experience has been and we certainly won't be an 22 obstacle to that. 23 THE COURT: And I can tell you that I think 24 I'm most comfortable with a hybrid solution and maybe 25 allowing one lawyer from each side to be there in person

and I just need to figure that out in terms of spacing and numbers.

But I think -- I think that's what -- that's where I'm leaning as I sit here right now. And I will tell you and update you every time we meet via Zoom, which I think will be frequent as we plan the details for this. I'll tell you exactly what I'm thinking as we go and we'll -- we'll figure it out. And I'll listen to your suggestions and your thoughts and we'll figure this out together.

MR. LAFATA: Thanks, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So ten days out, some -- somewhere in there, Donna Esposito will schedule us a Zoom to iron out any sort of issues on the online questionnaire and then we will talk about the next thing that we should plan for, which might be to begin to plan for some of the protocols. Right now I'm thinking a hybrid, so protocols for witnesses to testify via video, exhibits to be presented via video, protocols for that.

I think we might need protocols for jury selection via video because I'm not sure how comfortable in late January I'll be bringing in, you know, 70 people, having 70 citizens walk into our courthouse.

Part of the issue is that we are -- the judges are very educated on the risk and the things that we can

do to mitigate the risk. And we are comfortable with our infectious disease expert, we are comfortable with our protocols. We know that if we are having a jury trial and we are keeping our jurors separate, separated by six feet, and we keep Level 3 surgical masks on them at all times and we keep them apart and we monitor that, because the air filtration in our courthouse is good, we know that if a juror comes down with COVID in the middle of the trial, we remove the juror and we continue with the trial because our protocols are so good that there's no need under state guidance and under CDC guidance, and we've consulted the experts on this, there is no need to stop the trial.

But jurors -- to keep asking citizens to come into your courthouse and accept a level of risk that they don't necessarily understand, especially with this exponential growth in numbers, that's something that's hard to make people do. And so that's another practical reason the Court is just pausing at this time as people are looking around and thinking, oh, my God, everybody I know is being exposed to COVID. That's just another practical reason we're concerned about inviting, you know, citizens into the courthouse at a time like this where, you know, if you don't have all the knowledge, all the expertise, I think I'd step in and say, no, I

wouldn't want my family member going to serve on a jury in a courthouse where I'm not familiar with protocols, I'm not familiar with the building.

So I think come January 20th, if it's still really bad, I think we would need to come up with protocols to pick our jury via video so that we can do that and eliminate -- eliminate the risk.

DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: And one thing I'll add is that, you know, when we're thinking about how we want to -- what questions we want to issue in the online questionnaire, obviously if we include the complete set of voir dire when we send out the questionnaire, that gives us the maximum flexibility later on to decide how we want to do jury selection.

So we could -- if there's a comfort level with just issuing a complete questionnaire, the complete voir dire and -- in an online questionnaire to the jurors, we can do that and then we can decide later, okay, well, we want to do selection by video or we're okay doing it at the courthouse.

So that may buy us some time in how and when we make that decision, where if we -- if we only do a limited subset of the questions online, then that kind of ties our hands as far as doing a completely online jury selection.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

MR. LAFATA: In a -- in a completely online jury selection, I understand from the Court's rules that it's open-minded to attorneys asking follow-up questions from what comes in from the questionnaire. I don't -would that be possible then, if -- if there's a questionnaire that's got -- that has voir dire questions that the parties submitted and the parties have a follow-up question with juror number 18 about their question, is that -- would that be possible in that setting? DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: What we've --THE COURT: Yes. DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN: -- contemplated is that we would have -- we would run the selection list in advance -- we do this regardless of whether it's in person or online. A few days -- a day before, a few days before, we run the selection list so we ask our jury management system to issue a randomized list of the jurors that are available for selection. That's the order that they come out of the box virtually. And then those jurors would be assigned hour-long blocks to join via Zoom or appear at the courthouse to use the court's equipment to

join via Zoom and then the jurors would be brought into

the Zoom meeting one by one and you would be able to

```
1
    introduce yourselves and ask -- you would have that
2
    juror's questionnaire in front of you and their
3
    responses and then you would kind of prompt them and ask
4
    them questions to follow up on their answers, yes
5
    answers that they gave to the questions is how we
    contemplated doing that.
6
7
              And then at the end, the jurors would all be
    directed to -- once the juror is done, they're done.
8
    They are directed to call back into the court later that
9
    day to find out whether or not they've been seated on
10
11
    the jury.
12
              THE COURT: And then if they are seated,
13
    obviously I give them some initial instructions which
14
    would include, obviously, the classic instructions with
15
    respect to researching the case, social media,
16
    et cetera.
17
              So thank you very much, Tracy, for joining us.
18
    I know that the lawyers appreciate that. She is very
19
    busy and for you to take the time to come in and advise
20
    them on this process, I know they appreciate it.
21
    appreciate it. So thank you, Tracy.
22
              DEPUTY CLERK UHRIN:
                                    Thank you.
23
              THE COURT: And thanks to counsel. And I'll
24
    see you in about ten days and we'll -- we'll hammer out
25
    the online questionnaire.
```

```
MR. ORENT: Thank you, your Honor.
 1
 2
               MR. LAFATA: Thank you, your Honor.
 3
               MS. LOWRY: Thank you, your Honor.
               THE COURT: Court's adjourned.
 4
               (Proceedings concluded at 2:21 p.m.)
 5
 6
7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Liza W. Dubois, do hereby certify that the foregoing transcript is a true and accurate transcription of the within proceedings, to the best of my knowledge, skill, ability and belief.

Submitted: 11/30/2020 /s/ Liza W. Dubois
LIZA W. DUBOIS, RMR, CRR